grasp the essentials.
For more than 125 years before the passage of the APA the Supreme Court declared again and again that there is no room for arbitrary action in our system, that power to act arbitrarily is not delegated. Together with almost all of the Circuits it stated without equivocation across a wide spectrum of administrative activity that arbitrary action is reviewable." True, there were occasional exceptions; but in view Committee said: "Legislative intent to forbid judicial review must be, if not specific and in terms, at least clear, convincing and unmistakable under this bill." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1946) 10. E.g., "there is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary power." Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908) . Our Institutions "do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). "The delegated power, of course, may not be exercised arbitrarily .... " FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965) . For other citations, see notes 82-87 inIra.
11. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 277 (1933): "[Aln arbitrary or capricious finding does violence to the law. It is without the sanction of the authority conferred. And an inquiry into the facts . . . belongs to the judicial province .... . United States v. Pierce, 327 US. 515, 536 (1946) ("abuse of tile Commission's discretion'); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) (court should consider its on its discretion." Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (emphasis in original). "A government which . . . held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute despotism and unlimited control of even the most democratic depositary of power is after all but a despotism." Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1876).
13. For an unrestricted statutory mandate Mr. Saferstein would substitute a "threshold inquiry" in every case, not merely in the former "exceptional" case, to determine whether review should be allowed. The factors to be considered in making such threshold The Yale Law Journal which Mr. Saferstein airily skips in reliance on the Davis "solution, 1 1 4 that is controlling.
I. The Face of the Statute
As enacted, 15 Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act provided:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion-. . . (e) . . . the reviewing court shall . . . (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... 16
The central issue is whether the Section 10(e) directive to set aside arbitrary action is curtailed by the introdilctory second exception for action "committed to agency discretion."
Both "discretion" and "abuse of discretion" were terms of settled meaning at the time the APA was drafted. Courts had long said that discretion "means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily." 17 Given the fact that "delegated power, of course, determinations are, Mr. Saferstein asserts, "the interest in fostering the most creative and efficient use of limited agency resources," "the interest in the most efficient allocation of the resources of the federal courts," and the interest of "the individuals seriously cough affected by the agency's action to have standing to challenge its validity." Safersteln 371. Except where Congress has clearly provided for or against review of a particular agency action, Mr. Saferstein claims, the courts must undertake the difficult task of canvassing the effects of judicial review upon the two institutions irvolved, and then determining whether the adverse effects upon either institution are justified by the extra protection that might be afforded by review to the complaining individuals. Id. 372. put see Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 360 F.2d 715, 718 (1966) (Friendly, J.) ("[O] nly in the rare-some say nonexistent-case . .. may review for 'abuse' be precluded").
14. Saferstein 367 n.3, 374 n.32. Were the statute truly ambiguous, were its legislative history obscure or unenlightening, or were constitutional compulsions absent, Mr. Saferstein's "functional analysis" might conceivably offer some guidance. In the circumstances, however, his "functional" criteria cannot displace what the statute and the Constitution dearly require.
15. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946) . The Act was codified in 1966; Section 10 now appears in 5 U.S.C. § § 701-06 (Supp III, 1968) , in the following slightly modified form.
... except to the extent that-(l) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2 agency action is committed to agency discretion by law .... [t] he reviewipg court shal .. hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or qthcrwise not in accordance witl1 law.... 16. 60 Stat. 243 (1946) . 17. United States v. Davis, 202 F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Smaldone v. United States, 211 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Gir. 1954) ; Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931): "When invoked as a guide to judicial action [discretion] means a sound discretion . . a
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Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis may not be exercised arbitrarily,"' 8 "abuse of discretion" is necessarily excluded from the compass of a grant of "discretion." The point cannot be sufficiently stressed. An arbitrary finding "is outside the administrative discretion conferred by the statute"; 19 an officer "exceeds his authority by making a determination which is arbitrary or capricious"; 2 0 discretion simply "does not extend to arbitrary and unreasonable action." 2 ' "Arbitrary" or "capricious" action-terms used interchangeably with "abuse of discretion" 22 and coupled with it in Section 10(e)-may be defined as action unreasonable in the circumstances. 23 In judicial usage, "abuse of discretion" was and remains the antithesis of "reasonable" action or "sound" discretion.
This traditional antithesis is expressed on the face of the statute: "discretion" is by the second exception exempted from review, whereas Section 10(e)-which as enacted was headed "Scope of review"-directs that courts shall set aside action found to be an "abuse of discretion." Implicit in that directive under "Scope of review" is the postulate that there is a "Right of Review" of arbitrariness which is unaffected by the exception for "discretion.
2 -Otherwise, saving Professor Davis's tordiscretion exercised not arbitrarily." This was Lord Mansfield's definition, see note 38 infra. Professor Davis ridicules this "interpretation":
The cornerstone of [Berger's] argument about interpreting the APA is his proposition. repeatedly asserted, that "'discretion' and 'abuse of discretion' are opposites." My opinion is that of the three categories-(l) exercise of discretion, (2) proper exercise of discretion, and (3) abuse of discretion-the second and third are oppostes but the first and third are not. Berger 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1960 Cir. 1942) .
24. To Professor Jaffe this seems to require no argument: "The further provisions of the judicial review section [Section 10(e)] make it clear that the mere presence of agency The Yale Law Journal tured "solution," of which more below, the directive is unintelligibleCongress did not direct an overturn of action which but a few sentences earlier it had "excepted" from review. Nor was this an oversight, for, as will appear, the legislators gave unmistakable expression to their intention to make arbitrariness unqualifiedly reviewable. If we give to the statutory words the meaning given them by the courtsas we must under the rule that when an Act employs words which had acquired a "fixed meaning through judicial interpretations," "they are used in that sense unless the context requires the contrary ' ' 2 -the exception of "discretion" from review shielded "sound" discretion only; it in no wise exempted the antithetical "abuse of discretion" from the review expressly directed by Section 10(e).
To fill out the setting, Section 10(a), entitled "Right of Review," provides, roughly speaking, that any person "adversely affected or aggrieved" by agency action "shall be entitled to judicial review thereof." 20 Arbitrariness, Professor Davis concedes, is not authorized by the Constitution, 2 7 and, in the words of Section 10(e), it is "not in accordance with law." Consequently arbitrary action constitutes an infringement of due process in the basic sense of not being "in accordance with law"; 28 and one who is "adversely affected" by such conduct has a "Right of Review" unless it can be maintained that Congress intended to insulate unconstitutional action from review.
29
This analysis is reinforced by a number of considerations. A reading of "discretion" to include every exercise of discretion-"sound" or not-is manifestly absurd, because all agency action involves the exercise of discretion." Self-evidently Congress did not intend to make all discretion does not oust review. Under the heading 'Scope of Review' an agency action may be set aside for 'an abuse of discretion,' which dearly implies reviewability despite the presence of discretion." L. Davis' statements, note 30 and p. 974 infra. 30. In Homovich v. Chapman, 191 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1951) , the court rejected a claim by the Secretary of the Interior that by virtue of the second exception "there can be no review where agency action 'involves' discretion or judgment. Obviously the statute does not mean that; almost every agency action 'involves' an element of discretion or judgment. " See also Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir. 1959) . Mr. Saferstein is in accord. Saferstein 382. Professor Davis is quite clear that "nothing in the legislative history supports an intent to deprive courts of all power to correct any abuse of discretion." Davis, Supplement 21. Indeed, nothing in the legislative history supports an intent to deprive courts of all power to correct any abuse of discretion. Professor Davis Vol. 78: 965, 1969 Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis agency action unreviewable, including action that is in excess of statutory jurisdiction or unconstitutional, for Section 10 specifically orders such action to be set aside. So much even Professor Davis accepts. 31 Powerful evidence of a legislative intention to exclude "abuse of discretion" from the scope of the exception for "discretion" is furnished by the face of the statute itself. In striking at action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," Section 10(e) clearly implies that "abuse of discretion" is "not in accordance with law." The second exception, it must be remembered, shields only action "by law committed to agency discretion." Plainly Congress did not mean "by law" to commit to agency discretion action which it immediately branded as "not in accordance with law." "Abuse of discretion" is therefore patently excluded from the ambit of the exception for "discretion," and that exception consequently in no way limits the Section 10(e) directive. 3 2 The difficulties that Professor Davis experiences with Section 10 spring in considerable part from a refusal to accept that even "discretion" must be subject to preliminary review so as to screen permissible from impermissible action. 3 3 As Professor Jaffe points out, discretion is definable as "a power to make a choice within a class of actions. Despite such discretion, normally a court will review an agency's choice in order to determine whether it is within the permissible class of can point to no such history, and in fact disclaims reliance on the history. See p. 976 infra. We need to remember that " [t] he whole point of the jurisdiction to control administrative action is that it does apply to discretionary power. For it can hardly apply to anything else." Wade, Anglo-American Administrative Law: More Reflections, b2 L.Q.
Rav. 226, 252 (1966).
31. See note 30 supra, & p. 974 infra. 32. Although the statutory juxtaposition of "by law" and "not warranted by law" badly shakes Professor Davis's "solution," he has yet to attempt an explanation of this statutory bar to his view. Instead he asserts, "The Supreme Court unanimously says precisely the opposite"-sweet are the uses of "precisely---of my "main position" that "the second exception of section 10 does not curtail the section 10(e) directive to set aside 'abuse of discretion."' For "precisely the opposite" he cites the statement in Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Lines, 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958) , that "Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act... excludes from the categories of cases subject to judicial review 'agency action' that is 'by law committed to agency discretion.'" Davis, Not Always 643. Again the omnipresent Davis assumption that a bar to review of "discretion" ipso facto constitutes a bar to review of its abuse. Panama posed no "abuse" problem; there was no occasion to consider and the Court did not consider the effect of the "discretion" exception upon the Section 10(e) directive to set aside "abuse of discretion." "At heart," said the Court, the conflict was over "problems of statutory construction and cost accounting . . . on which the experts may disagree." 356 U.S. at 317. Where reasonable men may disagree a decision either way cannot be arbitrary. Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 226-27 (D.C. Cir. 1939); see FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (196-1); Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F-2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942) . And this is transformed into a holding which "sa~s precisely the opposite" of my position. ' The Yale Law Journal actions." 34 In judicial phraseology, the "reviewing court must satisfy itself that the administrative decision has a 'rational' or 'reasonable' foundation in law. ' 35 Refusal to accept this function leads Professor Davis to dismiss an illuminating bit of legislative history. Chairman McCarran had said that "the thought uppermost in presenting this bill [the APA] is that where an agency without authority or by caprice makes a decision, then it is subject to review." Senator Donnell then sought confirmation for his deduction that the mere vesting of discretion "is not intended" to preclude review in the event a party "claims there has been an abuse of discretion." McCarran replied, "It must not be an arbitrary discretion. It must be a judicial discretion; it must be a discretion based on sound reasoning." 3 6 Professor Davis comments, 
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Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis is expressed in the judicial inquiry whether "the administrative decision has a 'rational' or 'reasonable' foundation." Although Professor Davis has distinguished in another context between review of reasonableness and review of the wisdom of choices within the area of discretion, 3 9 he overlooks in the present context the distinction between a determination that a particular action falls outside a permissible class of actions, and a determination that on all the facts the action, even if unwise, is reasonable and within the permissible class. The Section 10 exception from review of action "by law committed to agency discretion" should thus be read as requiring a threshhold inquiry very different from that proposed by Davis and Saferstein: an inquiry to determine whether the challenged action falls inside or outside the limits of reasonable discretion. If it falls inside, the court's inquiry stops; if it falls outside, the court proceeds with review on the merits as directed by Section 10(e). Whether agency action has a "rational" basis is and must be open to inquiry; 40 In the words of judge Jerome Frank, "Courts have no power to review administrative discretion when it is reasonably exrcied ... [but] they an compel correction of an abuse of discretion," Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1950) .
39. In discussing judicial review of legislative rule-making, where insulation of administrative power is at its apogee, he states: "In reviewing a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (1) whether the rule is within the delegated authority, (2) whether it is reasonable .... But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule .... " I DAvis, TREATIsE § Although Mr. Berger's main position is that (1) the courts should always review abuse of discretion or arbitrariness, he couples that with the idea that (2) discretion should Often "remain unreviewable." These two propositions, in my opinion cannot possibly be adopted either by Congress or by the courts, because whenever a party falsely alleges abuse of discretion, the court cannot escape violation of either the first proposition or the second. If it does not inquire whether discretion has been abused, it violates the first, and if it does inquire, it reviews the exercise of discretion, thus violating the second. Mr. Berger's main position seems to me as logically impossible as a square circle. Davis, Not Always 647. To think that all judicial inquiries whether the exercs of discretion has a "rational" basis represent squaring the circle! Professor Davis would befog a simple point by verbal juggling of the many-hued word "review." Of course a court must preliminarily "review' discretionary action to determine whether it has a "rational" basis and represents "sound" discretion, or was arbitrry and an "abuse of discretion." Given absence of "abuse," inquiry halts and "review" of the "wisdon" of the choice is rejected. This is all that "unreviewable discretion" means, as my earlier citations attest.
will not "substitute their judgment" where they find a "rational" basis for the administrative choice, they have made amply plain that arbitrary action does not sail under that flag. 4 ' II. The Davis "Solution"
For Professor Davis the juxtaposition of "discretion" with "abuse of discretion" engenders a "difficult problem" 42 :
The literal language says that a court shall set aside an abuse of discretion except so far as the agency may exercise discretion. But this makes neither grammatical nor practical sense, for the exception consumes the whole power of the reviewing court. 42 But Section 10, as the Supreme Court said in a similar case, "is clear when its words are given their commonly accepted import." 4 4 Read in accordance with judicial usage, "discretion" or "reasonable" action does not "consume the whole power of the reviewing court," and it makes both "grammatical" and "practical sense" in conjunction with "abuse of discretion" or unreasonable action. Moreover, no confusion, grammatical or practical, exists between the exception for "discretion" and the direction to set aside "arbitrary, capricious" action. Still less are, or can be, the other Section 10(e) categories "consumed by" the exception. Who would argue that the exception for "discretion" rendered courts powerless to set aside action "(2) contrary to constitutional right. . ."?4rI How can the exception affect only the words "abuse 41. United States v. Pierce, 327 U.S. 515, 536 (1946) : "Unless in some specific respect there has been . . .abuse of the Commission's discretion, the reviewing court is without btuthority to ... substitute its own view concerning what should be done .
" So too, NLRB v. Muskingum Elec. Co-op, Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1960) , distinguished the "substitution of judgment" from inquiry whether the "circumstances clearly show an abuse of discretion." Speaking with reference to Section 10(e), Jenkins v. 45. "An agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory power," Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) ; far less the constitutionality of its actions.
Whether Professor Davis adheres to his rejection of a reading that "consumes tile whole power of the reviewing court" is by no means clear. His last word was that "the literal reading" of the "except" clause is always used in any combination other than with the "abuse of discretion" phrase. The literal reading is used in combination with (a), (b), (c), (d) , and all parts of (e) except the "abuse of discretion phrase." Davis, Not Always 650 n.11. By "literal reading" he means one opposed to mine, e.g., "Mr. Berger wants to interpret away the 'except' clause. The courts uniformly give full effect to the literal words
Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis of discretion" and leave all the rest of Section 10(e) untouched? 40 A reading which entails such irrational consequences must be summarily dismissed.
Whether the entirely verbal affinity between "discretion" and "abuse of discretion" gives way to the antithetical meaning given the terms by the courts, or is disregarded because to read discretion "literally" would "consume the whole power of the reviewing court," in either case Professor Davis's "difficult problem" vanishes. His "solution" is not dictated by logical or practical necessity but by his desire to carve out an exception from the unqualified directive of Section 10(e) for such cases as he considers "intrinsically unsuited" to review. 4 7 To accomplish this he redefines the word "committed," ordinarily defined as "entrusted to": if action is "committed" to agency discretion, he says, it is "unreviewable," if it is "unreviewable" it is "committed"-in the context of Section 10 "the two words have the same meaning." 4 This arbitrary redefinition of a statutory term to suit his purposes is without a leg to stand on. 49 Besides the logic of the statute and traditional judicial usage, there are other considerations which militate against the Davis "solution." The Supreme Court has stated that exemptions from the APA-here from the express Section 10(e) directive--"are not lightly to be presumed."
5 0 In addition there is the "presumption that arbitrariness is reviewable unless there is 'evidence to the contrary' that Congress of the 'except' clause." Davis, Supplement 17. Can he mean that "literally" the exception for "discretion" forecloses review, for example, of Section 10(e)(2) action "contrary to 48. The main idea is to emphasize the word "committed." So far as the action is by law "committed" to agency discretion, it is not reviewable, even for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion; it is not "committed" to agency discretion to the extent that it is reviewable. This means that the two concepts "committed to agency discretion" and "unreviewable" have in this limited context the same meaning. Both depend upon the statutes and the common law. To the extent that "the law" cuts off review for abuse of discretion, the action is committed to agency discretion. The result is that the pre-act law on this point continues. Davis, Postscript 825. 49. His redefinition is not, however, altogether without precedent: "'When I use a word,' Humpty-Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I dcootc it to mean-neither more nor less." L. CARRoLL, THROUGH THE LoomIxG GLASS ch. 6. But the "plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense." Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co. 267 U.S.
. 64, 370 (1925) ; see Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932) .
50. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1936) . Then too, "However inclusive may be the general language of a statute it will not be held to appl) to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment .... Since he confessedly does "not base [his] position upon the legislative history," but "upon an effort to find a sound solution"; 5 3 since, in his own words, his "solution" is no more than "a practical interpretation which will carry out the probable intent";,' since he now concedes, "I do not say that the statutory words require my interpretation. Nor do I say that the legislative history must be interpreted my way"; 5 5 and since he claims no more than that "taken as a whole, [the legislative history] is not inconsistent with my solution; 5 6 where is the "clear and convincing" congressional "evidence to the contrary" which alone can rebut the presumption for review and "close the door" to review?
57
In fact, Professor Davis's reading of "committed" is inconsistent with the legislative history. 58 Let me dwell at this juncture only on materials which bear directly on the word "committed." Early in the legislative process there was concern whether the "committed" phrase made it clear that only "abuse of discretion granted by law" was reviewable,5 9 exhibiting, first, an understanding that "committed" merely 51. Davis Before he was called to account, he asserted that the "words of the Act, after all, are clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal"; that "the strongest part" of the legislative history supported his reading; that the second exception was "a clear exptres. sion of Congress in favor of preventing review"; and that "the courts uniformly read this provision literally, because they believe that Congress intended what it so clearly said." Davis, Supplement 19, 18, 25. His was "the orthodox interpretation of § 10." Id. 24. Since then he has returned to his original view, saying: "The Berger interpretation of the APA has nothing against it except the clear statutory words .
Davis, Not Always 644. See also Appendix note 14 infra.
57. See also note 6 supra. In addition, one who would cut down the plain Section 10(e) directive labors under a heavy burden. As Chief Justice Marshall said: "[I]f the plain meaning of a provision ... is to be disregarded, because we believe that the framers of the instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case would be ... It is proposed that the phrase "by law committed to agency discretion" might be clarified to indicate that judicial review is conferred only to correct an "abuse of discretion granted by law." So far as necessary, the matter may be explained by committee report. S. Doc. No. 248, at 36. meant "granted," its traditional meaning, and second, an understanding that discretion "granted [i.e., "committed"] by law" might be abused and would then be reviewable. The leading Senate proponent of the APA, Chairman McCarran, explained shortly after enactment that "committed by law" means, "of course, that claimed discretion must have been intentionally given to the agency by the Congress, rather than assumed by it." "Abuse of discretion," he continued, "is expressly made reviewable" by Section 10(e). 60 In short, "by law committed" simply means "granted" or "entrusted with,"' 61 not "unreviewable,"
as is confirmed by the face of the statute: "discretion" "by law committed" cannot comprehend "abuse of discretion," which Congress stamped as "not in accordance with law." 0 2
The Davis "solution" suffers from yet another infirmity, deriving from the fact that it "depend[s] upon statutes and the common law." ' He cites no case which does not turn on an interpretation of a statutory grant of administrative jurisdiction, and his assertion of a "common law" of nonreviewable arbitrariness boils down to judicial construcdons of such statutory grants. 4 But if a statute expressly bars review, the matter is covered by the first exception of Section 10 for cases in which "statutes preclude review"; and if judicial construction of a statute bars review, this is "inexplicit" preclusion which is also covered by the first exception.
65 Consequently a construction of the second exception to preserve statutes which (allegedly) preclude review of arbitrariness is supererogatory. Professor Davis's argument that there is an "overlap" between the first and second exceptions 0 not only The first exception preserves existing statutes such as the Veterans Administration Act. which provides in certain cases that no court shall have jurisdiction to review. See p. 993 infra. The second exception merely insures that a sound exercise of di=cretion shall
977
The Yale Law Journal attributes to Congress special anxiety to shield selected arbitrariness from review, for which there is not a shred of evidence in the legislative history, 7 but also establishes a perplexing dual set of standards for reviewability. The test of nonreviewability under the first exception is stated by the House Report: "To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in withhholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it."6S The proposed Davis test under the second exception is whether the function in question is "intrinsically unsuited" for judicial review. 69 Professor Davis maintains that "nothing of substance hinges on the classification" between the first and second exceptions, 0 but he has yet to explain why in that case Congress should have pro. vided two disparate standards of review, unaccompanied by clues as to the governing standard for a case of "overlapping."
III. The Legislative History
We have seen Chairman McCarran's assurance to Senator Donnell that grants of "discretion" were "not intended" to preclude review of arbitrariness, his subsequent explanation of "committed to discretion" in terms of grant, and his statement that "abuse of discretion is expressly made reviewable by Section 10(e)." 7 1 In the House, Chairman Walter said of the discretion of administrative agencies: "They do not have the authority in any case to act blindly or arbitrarily. '7 2 remain unreviewable; it does not provide that arbitrariness shall not be reviewable, nor that the court is without all jurisdiction in the premises. Professor Davis argues, "Whenever a statute cuts off review of a discretionary determination, I think the statue precludes review . . . ." Davis, Not Always 652 n.30 . This is to reason that because apples and oranges are both fruit they are therefore identical. Since every agency is created by statute and must of necessity have discretion, whether or not conferred in terms, it follows in the Davis lexicon that every statute must prevent review. On that analysis the first excep. tion is supererogatory. If, on the other hand, we adopt Professor Davis's reading of "committed to discretion" as providing for selective unrevsewability by virtue of prior statutes such situations would be covered by the first exception, because a "statute precludes review." It is a common-place that one avoids constructions that result in surplusage or tautology. Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F.2d 166, 172 (8th Cir. 1938 However reasonable this proposition may seem, if it means that courts may always set aside blind or arbitrary action, it is inconsistent with tradition and with the unambiguous words of the Act providing for review "except so far as . . .agency action is by law committed to agency discretion." 3 Since Professor Davis no longer claims that the "exception" is "unambiguous," 7 4 we may turn to his "tradition." He himself has said that "Congress has power within reasonable limits to determine" "what administrative action shall be reviewable"; and it can scarcely be maintained that an Act which implements the "laudable purpose" of "reducing injustice by allowing the courts to correct administrative arbitrariness or abuse of discretion" 7 5 is unreasonable. Congress may supplant either the common law or a "tradition" by statute; the only question is whether it has expressed its intention to do so. For that expression we have the truly "unambiguous" Section 10(e) directive to set arbitrariness aside, amplified by Chairman Walter's statement that it was applicable "in any case," and Congressman Springer's statement that the directive expressed a "sound philosophy."
70 'Whatever the scope of the alleged "tradition," the first duty of the courts is to give effect to the plain terms of the statute, particularly since they are confirmed by a clear legislative history." 7 Originally Professor Davis charged me with ignoring "the strongest part" of the legislative history which allegedly "supports [his] literal reading"; 78 but he has retreated from this position. Now his purpose in presenting "the legislative history opposed to Mr. Berger's position ... is not to show that it leads to a conclusion against Berger," but found to be capricious or an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law, the decision can be set aside. That is certainly fair. that is certainly equitable, and is certainly based upon a sound philosophy.
S. Doc. No. 248, at 377. To carve out exceptions from the "sound philosophy" of the general rule more is needed than vague references to an intention to "preserve discretion. ' See Appendix, pp. 1001-1003 infra. 77. The House Report alone would refute Mr. Saferstein's "doctrine" of "refusal to hear an allegation" of arbitrariness, Saferstein 368 n.5 (emphasis added): "In any case the existence of discretion does not prevent a person from bringing a review action but merely prevents him pro tanto from prevailing therein." S. Doc. No. 248. at 275 (emphasis added). In other words, the second exception does not bar a "hearing" of charges of arbitrary conduct even though the litigant may fail to establish arbitrariness "therein." 
4 DAvis
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The Yale Law Journal merely to "show that it is conflicting." Now the legislative history invoked by him merely "seems to [him] rather substantial, just as the legislative history in support of Mr. Berger's position is rather substantial." 79 In fact, his selective unreviewability gloss finds no support in the history. The excerpts he invokes merely amount to this: "by law committed" means "by law committed" and nothing more; "discretion" must be "preserved." 80 Of course "discretion" must be preserved; but where is one scrap of evidence that some "abuse of discretion" must be preserved as well? Under established judicial usage "discretion" is "preserved" even though "abuse of discretion" is made reviewable. The legislative history plainly confirms what Section 10 provides: only the exercise of "sound" discretion was sheltered by the second exception; the directive to set arbitrariness aside was left untouched.
IV. Constitutional Requirements
"The most extreme of all Berger positions," says Professor Davis, "is that the Constitution requires review of arbitrariness. No case supports him." 8 ' Let me summarize some of the cases that I spread before him. A provision that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, said Justice William Johnson in 1819, was "intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government." 8 2 There followed cases in which the Court stated that (1) our institutions "do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power." 8' 8 (2) The Constitution condemns "all arbitrary exercise of power." 84 (3) A state governor's order "may not stand if it is an act of mere oppression, an In an uncontentious moment Professor Davis himself stated, "The requirement of reasonableness stems both from the idea of constitutional due process and from the idea of statutory interpretation that legislative bodies are assumed to intend to avoid the delegation of power to act unreasonably." 88 Professor Davis concedes that this is an "impressive collection of Supreme Court statements," but goes on:
I agree with those statements; I do not see how anyone could disagree with them. But they do not prove that arbitrary exercise of power is always reviewable. One of Mr. Berger's pervasive mistakes is to equate lack of authority to act arbitrarily with judicial reviewability. The Court is hardly to be charged with idle utterance of noble sentiments which it means to be unenforceable. In fact, after stating that "There is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary power," the Court went on to say, "if the Secretary has exceeded the authority conferred upon him by law, then there is power in the courts to restore the status of the parties aggrieved by such unwarranted action,"9 0 as Yick Wo had earlier taught in setting 94, 110 (1902) , the Court said that courts must have the "power ... to grant relicf" to protect against "uncontrolled and arbitrary action." See also Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U.S. 477, 483 (1913) .
In a suit for the return of property seized by the government as allegedly enemy.owned during World War I, the Supreme Court held that the Trading with the Enemy Act would have been of doubtful constitutioriality had it failed to supply an adequate remedy to the non-enemy owner. Constitutional rights must be afforded vindication. Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 79 (1935 
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Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis Davis implies what Section 10(e) makes explicit-that arbitrary action is "not in accordance with law." 90 1 It follows that such action is without "due process of law" in its primal sense:
[when the great barons of England wrung from King John ... the concession that neither their lives nor their property should be disposed of by the crown, except as provided by the law of the land, they meant by "law of the land" the ancient and customary laws of the English people, or laws enacted by the Parliament, of which the barons were a controlling element. 7 Injury not authorized by the Constitution is therefore contrary to the "law of the land" and is forbidden by due process.
Next Professor Davis maintains that
[t]hroughout our history, the Supreme Court has held some administrative action unreviewable for arbitrariness or abuse. In the foundation case in 1827, the Court refused to review a finding of fact and declared: "It is no answer that such a power may be abused, for there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse." 9 8 But actual as against possible abuse was something else again, for the Founders looked to the courts to protect the citizen against governmental excesses or "abuse of power"; 9 and the incautious 1827 statement is repudiated by widespread current review of arbitrariness. But first let us look at Professor Davis's "foundation case," Martin v. Mott, 0 0 which involved a statute authorizing the President to call forth the state militia whenever the United States "shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion." Understandably the Court refused to review the President's finding of fact. The most ardent proponent of judicial review must shrink from halting the President to allow lawyers to wrangle over the imminence of an invasion threat. 'While they squabbled the nation might be overrun. Nonmention of a constitutional question in a case affords a dubious base upon which to build constitutional doctrine;" 0 and it can hardly weigh in the scales with unequivocal Supreme Court statements that arbitrariness is beyond the pale. Professor Davis also relies on the fact that the complaint was dismissed without review on the merits, in spite of allegations that both the denial of the petition involved and the form of ballot used had 102. 4 DAVIS, TREATISE § 28.04, at 15. 103. Id. 17. Reliance on "superseded" cases by others is viewed with disfavor by Davis: "Jaffe should have found the many later cases that superseded the cases ne cites. ' 
Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis been "arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory.""' Nothing in the case suggests, however, that the Court's decision was anything more than the normal determination that the agency's action fell within the bounds of rational choice. The Court rejected the allegation that the denial of the petition had been arbitrary by finding the contention that the "Board ignored an express command of the Act" to be "completely devoid of merit."" ' In rejecting the allegation in the complaint that "the form of ballot . . . is arbitrary," the Court did say that "[t]he Board's choice of its proposed ballot is not subject to judicial review .... .113 But the Court also stated that "there is nothing to suggest that in framing [the ballot] the Board exceeded its statutory authority," and that the Board had been "careful to provide fair, yet effective procedures." 1 4 These statements preclude any inference that the Board may be arbitrary in choosing a ballot, and make it clear that the Brotherhood case is no exception either to the Court's subsequent statement that "delegated power, of course, may not be exercised arbitrarily,"" 6 5 or to the general rule that arbitrariness is reviewable. Thus the "most important single case against Berger's view" will not support the inferences Professor Davis would wrest from it.
In harmony with his general emphasis on considerations of agency and court convenience rather than upon the rights of those adversely affected by agency action, Mr. Saferstein relegates consideration of my constitutional arguments to a footnote. "Berger," he remarks, "also makes a constitutional argument, which seems to say that a claim of abuse of discretion always rises to constitutional magnitude."" 6 "[I]f a broad definition of 'abuse' is meant," he says, apparently with "unwise use" or some equivalent in mind, "it is unlikely that most alleged abuses will rise to such a level." 1 7 If the normal narrower meaning governs, however, Mr. Saferstein's objections fade. Apparently he approves Judge Friendly's suggestion that an abuse of discretion standard can be used as a criterion for review if defined to cover only actions alleged to be "arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view." 118 "With this narrow scope of review," says Mr. Saferstein, "an allegation of abuse arguably could always be reviewed without the balance between the individual and the institutions being upset." 1 9 From the very beginning I emphasized that the terms "abuse of discretion" and "arbitrary, capricious action" are used interchangeably by the courts, 1 ' 20 and my concern has always and explicity been with "Administrative Arbitrariness." Consequently my views do fall within the "narrow" Friendly formulation, and as Mr. Saferstein recognizes, the "narrow standard [does] require at the least a summary review of the administrative action."
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But Mr. Saferstein leaves his position on the constitutional argument in some confusion, for he maintains that whether the definition of abuse be "broad" or "narrow," and "granting that judicial relief is often guaranteed on certain allegations," "there is no reason to believe that such a right [of judicial review] would not depend-as do so many constitutional rights-upon a balancing process . . . between the individual and the institutional interests."' 2 1 "2 And he states that "the committed-to-agency-discretion doctrine . . . usually yields to nonfrivolous constitutional claims such as those of deprivation of property and liberty without due process."'1 2 3 If this is designed to differentiate deprivation of "due process" from what Justice Jackson called its chief object, to protect the individual against governmental arbitrariness, 2 4 Mr. Saferstein is badly mistaken. In deciding on the merits in a given case whether there was arbitrariness, possibly the court may "balance" the individual interest against institutional interests, though one may doubt whether a little bit of arbitrariness should be better sheltered than a little bit of rape.
2 5 Constitutional rights would be in parlous straits were they (1961) , in which the discharge of a short-order cook at a naval gun factory was sustained on "security" grounds:
it is surely startling to encounter the constitutional principle that the government must grant hearings to private persons before inflicting palpable injury, except that it need not do so when the injury, though undoubted and bitterly complained of, seems slight. A. BIcKL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 168 (1962). See also note 82 supra.
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Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis left at the mercy of untested assertions of "frivolity," or of preliminary judicial "balancing" to determine whether there has been enough injury to a constitutional right to entitle the individual to complain and be heard. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court has stated the rule: "It is to be presumed in favor of the jurisdiction of the Court that the plaintiff may be able to prove the right which he asserts in his declaration."' ' And the constitutional ban on arbitrariness, I submit, bars Mr. Saferstein's doctrine of "nonreview" couched in terms of "a refusal to hear an allegation against any part of an agency determination.'
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Nor should "excessive cost" to the agency or the courts 1' be "balanced" against invasion of the constitutional right to be protected against unreasonable officialdom. "Due process" can hardly be denied because protection is "inconvenient." "We must not," said the Second Circuit, "play fast and loose with basic constitutional rights in the interest of administrative efficiency."'-' 0 Indeed, the Senate Report stated that the APA "must reasonably protect private parties even at the risk of some incidental or possible inconvenience to or change in present administrative operations."' 30 When Mr. Saferstein concludes that "to demand that courts give review whenever a complaint utters the formula 'abuse of discretion' is to hazard a serious misallocation of judicial resources as well as a stifling of agency and congressional programs,"' 31 he posits that man exists for the state rather than, as our Founders conceived, that the state exists for the protection of the individual. In the Convention, James Wilson asked, "Will a regard to Cir. 1961 ) (rejecting argument that "if a hearing is ordered in this instance it will encourage a flood of such petitions").
The Supreme Court said of a denaturalization based upon prolonged residence in the country of origin that such legislation touching on the "most precious rights" of citizenship would have to be justified under the foreign relations power "by sonic more urgent public necessity than substituting administrative convenience for the individual right of which the citizen is deprived." Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 167 (1964) .
130. S. Doc. No. 248, at 191 . Application of Mr. Saferstein's elaborate criteria for making a preliminary determination whether to review arbitrariness, Saferstein 371-95, would bog the courts down far more than a determination whether the facts make out unreasonable conduct. Compare Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1966) : "a review of refusals to reopen necessarily limited to abuse of discretion, would impose a relatively slight burden on the agency and the courts." (Friendly, J.) 131. Saferstein 375.
state rights justify the sacrifice of the rights of men?" 182 And as Justice Wilson, he declared in his 1791 Lecture that the purpose of this "magnificent" "structure of government" was for the accommodation "of the sovereign, Man," and that the "primary and principal object"
was "to acquire a new security" for his rights. 133 In large part judicial review owes its being to the Founders' anxiety for the protection of private rights; and it would be a betrayal of judicial responsibility were the courts to bow out on the plea that they are too busy to afford such protection.
Mr. Saferstein is also troubled by the "uncertainties in defining and applying an abuse-of-discretion standard in the past"; it is not clear, he says, quoting Judge Friendly, "precisely what this [standard] means."' 1 34 One can categorize some types of arbitrariness on the basis of the cases, 135 but it is true that "No standard or measuring stick has been or can be devised that may be successfully applied in all cases." 1 3 0 That difficulty, however, is no greater than that of defining the myriad varieties of "unreasonable" conduct in negligence cases, or of determining when a restraint of trade is "unreasonable" in an antitrust case; yet no attempt to wall off the assertion of such claims has been made in those fields. Lack of tidy definition pervades the entire domain of due process itself, 37 but no one suggests that the enforcement of due process must therefore be abandoned or curtailed. In practice, courts have experienced no great difficulty in recognizing "arbitrary" conduct, which must strike a court as "unreasonable" in all the circumstances.
V. Professor Davis's Codification Argument
Unlike Mr. Saferstein, Professor Davis does not claim that his as yet unborn "committed" "solution" was codified in 1946. Instead he relies on the "1966 codification of the APA" as a "conclusive" demonstration that his view had been "codified," invoking the rephrased statement that judicial review does not apply to "agency action . . . 530 (1954) , employing a "fair play" test of due process. "Fair play" is no more precise a standard than "unreasonable" action.
1 M. FARRAND, THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
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Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis committed to agency discretion by law."' 38 But for the transfer of the words "by law" from the original "committed by law" to the end of the phrase, and substitution of "to the extent that" for "so far as," the "codified" exception is in relevant part identical with that of 1 946.:la0 This is his entire argument. Simple retention of the original "committed" phrase does not spell approval of his artificial interpretation. Of course, "discretion," in the sense employed by the courts, is unreviewable. But the codifiers nowhere indicate that "abuse of discretion" or arbitrary action is also unreviewable, in whole or in part. Professor Davis himself states that "the theory of codification is that no substantive change is made, and I agree with the codifiers that in this provision they have made no substantive change. "' 141 In that event, "codification" left him exactly
where it found him, struggling to impose his "solution" after enactment. Once more refutation of Professor Davis may be based upon his own text. Speaking of the related "reenactment rule"-the doctrine that subsequent reenactment of a statute constitutes adoption of its administrative construction-he states: "Chief Justice Warren quite accurately said for the Court in 1955 that "reenactment . . .is an unreliable indicium at best."'1 ' ' "Whenever a congressional awareness of the administrative interpretation does not appear, and seems unlikely," states Professor Davis, "the basis for the reenactment rule vanishes."' 43 There is not a scintilla of evidence that either Congress or the codifiers were apprised of his "solution."
158. Davis, Not Always 644. 159 . Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946) , provided: "Except so far as
(1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion .... The 1966 codification, 80 Stat. 392, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1966), provides: "This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-(l) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 140. Davis, Not Always 644. So sure is he that he has scored a stunning triumph that he concludes: "This means that Berger's main position that the APA makes such action reviewable becomes an unseemly posture of lying fiat on his back with all four wheels spinning. The APA can have no effect on something to which it does not apply. The codifiers have taken my view." 141. Id. 650 n.12.
142. 1 DAvIS, TREATISE § 5.07, at 333.
Id. 334. At 335 he states:
A 1957 decision of the Supreme Court refusing to apply the reenactment rule seems especially encouraging and would be much more encouraging if only one could find reason to believe that the Court would consistently follow it in the future: . . . "The regulation had been in effect for only three years, and there is nothing to Indicate that it was ever called to the attention of Congress. The reenactment . . . was not accompanied by any congressional discussion which throws light on the intended scope.
In such circumstances we consider the 1951 reenactment to be without significance." The Yale Law Journal Finally, discussing a Treasury Regulation in the frame of "reenactment" he states in his text: "It was not and could not have been a codification of judicial decisions, for the decisions were often conflicting."' 144 Viewed most favorably to Professor Davis, the best that can be said of the decisions since 1946 is that they were "conflicting." By far the largest number of cases unconcernedly declare arbitrariness reviewable without so much as a glance at either the second exception or the Davis "solution."' 145 A few cases held that the discretion excep-144. 1 DAvis, TREATisE § 5.05, at 321. The Court also stated in Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 534 (1947) : "We do not expect Congress to make an affirmative move every time a lower court indulges in an erroneous interpretation. In short, the original legislative language speaks louder than such judicial action."
145. As in the case of the pre-1946 cases collected in note 11 supra, the vast majority of post-1946 cases formulate the problem in the same earlier terms, e.g., search for a "rational" basis, whether the action is "arbitrary or capricious" and the like. Helpers, 192 F. Supp. 198, 200 (D. Del. 1961 ) ("A reasonable determination is the antithesis of one which is arbitrary"). Fourth Circuit: RFC v. Lightsey, 185 F.2d 167, 170 (1950) (conclusive unless "arbitrary and capricious'). Fifth Circuit: Nadiak v. CAB, 305 F.2d 588, 593 (1962) (wide discretion: review confined "to whether there was an abuse of discretion"); United States v. Marshall Durbin Co., 363 F.2d 1, 5 (1966) ("If the order is arbitrary . . . judicial review may be obtained'). Sixth Circuit: General Motors Corp. v. United States, 324 F.2d 604, 605 (1963) (action will be set aside if "arbitrary or capricious'). Seventh Circuit: United States ex rel. Beck v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 221, 223 (1953) (court will set aside action for "mani!-fest abuse of discretion'); Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282 F.2d 874, 876 (1960) (court will "examine the record to see whether discretion .. . has been abused'). Eighth Circuit: NLRB v. Minnesota Mining 9-Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 323, 326 (1950) (Section 10(e) made no "material change in the scope of review"; an order which is "arbitrary and capricious . . (re Section 10(e): "As long as the administrative agency . . . had a sound basis for the decision made, and the decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion... then the courts will not substitute their own decision"). Tenth Circuit: NLRB v. Continental Oil Co., 179 F.2d 552, 554 (1950) (action will be set aside if "arbitrary or capricious'); Smaldone v. United States, 211 F.2d 161, 163 (1954) (discretion "means sound discretion . . . not discretion exercised arbitrarily'); Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Anderson, 75 F. Supp. 363, 368 (D. Kan. 1947 ) (discretion "not subject to judicial control unless abused or exercised arbitrarily or capriciously'). District of Columbia Circuit: Eustace v. Day, 314 F.2d 247 (1962) (court will "not substitute its own judgment" if "there is a rational basis" for the conclusion); American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346, 349 (1953) Abundant authority, with which we agree, holds that the comptroller's determination in the present area is not immunized from review by the exemption in the preface of § 1009 ... [for agency discretion].
[His] discretion ... is not the t)pe of discretion to which action has been "committed by law" but rather one of the character expressly made reviewable by § 1009(e). 352 F.2d at 270, citing Professor Davis. The court furnishes no clue to the criteria which make arbitrariness nonreviewable; and such effect as Saxon may have is diluted by the fact that the Fourth Circuit has since declared without reference either to Saxon or Professor Davis that a court may reverse when an administrative decision is "arbitrary, unreasonable, [or] capricious." Halsey v. Nitze, 390 F.2d 142, 144 (1968) .
So too, the Eighth Circuit, after a line of orthodox statements, note 145 supra, said respecting the Comptroller's "discretion":
[IJhe congressional grant of authority does not empower arbitrary and capricious action, nor does it contemplate abuse of that discretion .... ... This holding we believe to be consistent with § 10 .... [N] or is this the t)pe of agency action that is by law committed to agency discretion so as to be 'immunized from review by the exception.' Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 387, 388 (8th Cir. 1966 Cir. 1967) , which relied for jurisdiction on Section 10(e) and stated: "The standard of review is whether the administrative agency committed an abuse of discretion," Though the determination "was a matter of administrative discretion," it could be set aside for a "clear abuse of such discretion." Id. at 286. And in Amarillo-Borger Express v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1956), a three-judge court rejected the argument that arbitrariness was unreviewable because the matter was "committed to the discretion of the Commission," id. at 415, concluding that the "exercise of discretion" is "precisely [one ofj the matters which Congress .. . intended should be under, not exempt from, the Administrative Procedure Act," id. The courts uniformly give effect to the literal words of the 'except' clause." Davis, Supplement 17. For comment on his muddy use of "literal," see Appendix note 14 infra.
In his last word, he stated: "The Berger interpretation of the APA has nothing against it except the clear statutory words, the unanimous Supreme Court, the unanimous lower courts, and now the unanimous Congress in the codificationl" Davis, Not Always 644. Glory Hallelujah.
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Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis have sailed along without reference to the Davis "solution" or the "codification" of his view; 1I 0 and that view, though not tagged with his name, has in fact been explicitly rejected by the District of Columbia Circuit, 51 which handles a large proportion of the administrative agency litigation.
VI. Nonreview Exceptions
Before discussing pre-APA "exceptions" to the general rule that arbitrariness is reviewable, let me repudiate a fatuous position that Professor Davis would attribute to me. "Berger's main thesis," he asserts, "is that the Administrative Procedure Act makes administrative arbitrariness or abuse of discretion always judicially reviewable."' 52 By way of triumphant refutation he cites the Veterans Administration Act, which "makes certain decisions on veterans' claims 'final and conclusive'" and provides that "no . . . court . . . shall have power or jurisdiction to review." ' 5 3 That situation is governed by the first exception of Section 10 for cases in which "statutes preclude review"; and when all jurisdiction to review is withdrawn by statute, the Section 10(e) directive to set arbitrariness aside obviously cannot apply.'"t Not for me the argument that one part of the Act makes hash of another. Whether Congress may constitutionally cut off all review of a constitutional claim is a different question, to which I have addressed myself at considerable length elsewhere.lt 5 154. Professor Davis recognizes in a footnote that I confine my "discu "ion to the second exception of § 10 [and consider] that anything governed by the first exception can be excluded from [my] discussion." Id. 652 n.30. But he comments: "One of the strangest positions Mr. Berger takes is that a court's denial of review on the ground that a statute precludes review is not authority against his position that arbitrariness is always reviewable," id., appealing again to the "Not Always Reviewable" straw man to whom his last piece was dedicated. For discussion of the relation between the two exceptions, see note 66 supra.
155. Since adequate discussion is impossible here, I must be content to say that my own protracted re-examination of the source materials--the records of the Federal Con.
itself cuts off review, a matter to which I shall recur, I would not be so callow as to maintain that the APA overrides the Constitution.
The issue of pre-APA "exceptions" to the general rule that arbitrariness is reviewable needs to be brought back into focus. The problem is not, as Professor Davis assumes, "whether some agency action must be unreviewable even to correct arbitrariness or abuse,"' ' 0 but, since the statute governs, whether Section 10 makes it unreviewable, whether it leaves room for exceptions to the Section 10(e) mandate to set arbitrary action aside. If my analysis is sound, the terms of Section 10, confirmed by the legislative history, unqualifiedly direct courts to set arbitrariness aside. This may in Professor Davis's view be regrettable, but only Congress can cure regrettable legislative oversights.
In considering the scope of Section 10(e) it needs constantly to be borne in mind that Chairman Walter advised the House that agencies "do not have authority in any case to act blindly or arbitrarily, ' ' 1 and that Chairman McCarran, shortly after enactment of the APA, explained to the bar that it is a "major premise of the statute that judicial review is not merely available but is plenary .... [N] o citizen need complain that he is without it if he has been subjected to injury beyond the law."' '1 8 Arbitrary action, be it remembered, is branded by Section 10(e) as "not in accordance with law." In sum, as Judge Holtzoff, a veteran of the Washington scene, stated:
Contemporary discussion and debate clearly demonstrate that one of the main objectives of the Administrative Procedure Act was to extend the right of judicial review. One of its purposes was to enlarge the authority of the courts to check illegal and arbitrary administrative action.' 59 vention and of the state ratification conventions--and of other materials of that period, as well as a large body of writing about those materials and sources, which is set forth I R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SuPREM COURT, (to be published; Harvard University Press 1969), led me to concur in Professor Hart's view that it is (and was) "a necessary postulate of constitutional government ... that a court must always be available to pass on decisions of constitutional right to judicial process, and to provide such process if the claim is stus. L. REv. 1362 L. REv. , 1372 L. REv. (1953 . In Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (1948) , the court said that Congress "must not so exercise" its "undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction [of tile federal courts Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis With this in mind, let us turn to two of Professor Davis's most dramatic examples, the "exceptions" for the military and the executive branch.
A. The Lllilitaqy "Exception"
Any assumption that the military is automatically shielded by a "general presumption against review" of arbitrariness is foreclosed by Sterling v. Constantin: "What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions."' 60 Moreover, only specified functions of the military are by the Section 2(a) definition of "agency" excluded from the operation of this Act," namely "(2) courts martial and military commissions," and (3) "military or naval authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory."
16 These express exclusions, under familiar principles, leave all other military functions subject to the Act. As the Senate Report states: "certain war and defense functions are exempted, but not the War or Navy departments in the performance of their other duties."' 1 2 Although Professor Davis is aware that the military is included in Section 2(a), 1 6 he never comes to grips with the fact that Section 2(a) dearly makes the APA applicable to its non-"in the field" functions. In effect he argues that Congress could not have meant what it said, and offers what he apparently considers a simply smashing example of absurdity: "A lieutenant in Vietnam surely lacks authority to pick on the same private for every dangerous mission, but that does not mean a court will or should review.' 64 Since Professor Davis assumes that "the technical law is that we are not at war in Vietnam,"'1 5 his example is not protected by the Section 2(a) exclusion of acts "in the field in time of war." On that hypothesis, a sorrier example to justify curtailment of the express statutory directive is hardly conceivable. Let us go beyond Professor Davis and assume a state of war, so that the courts by hypothesis have no APA jurisdiction. Suppose too that the lieutenant, warped by racial prejudice, persistently picks on a Negro for "every dangerous mission," which on the law of averages spells certain death. Should The Yale Law Journal one even in this case dogmatically assume that review of unconstitutional discrimination can be barred? 16 Another reductio ad absurdum posed by Professor Davis is an in. quiry by the courts "whether a commanding officer of a domestic military post has abused his discretion in denying a requested leave." ' u " Suppose that leave is persistently denied because the officer hates Negroes or redheads; should we strain to construe the APA so as to leave them at his mercy? 0 8 Professor Davis misconceives the issue when he asks: "Do we want the courts to review for possible abuse of discretion all the determinations made by officers of the army, navy and air forces in domestic military posts?"' 10 9 What "we want" must yield to what the statute provides; and as we have seen, the APA exclusion of "in the field" functions manifests an intention to govern the nonexcluded "domestic military post." ' loa Nor is this as selfevidently absurd as Professor Davis conceives. The Swedish Military Ombudsman was created "to guard citizens against abuses in military administration"; and if the examples cited by Professor Gellhorn 70 166. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957), involved the conviction by a court martial In Britain of the wife of an Air Force sergeant for his murder. An Executive Agreement gave our military courts exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Britain by American servicemen or their dependents. In reply to objections that the court martial denied fundamental rights, the government invoked the treaty power. The Court held that "[t]he pro. hibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and Senate combined." Parenthetically, the exception afforded "courts martial" by Section 2(a) was unmentioned.
167. 4 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.18, at 82.
168. "Assuredly, the commanding officer of an aircraft carrier docked in New York Harbor has absolute authority to order all visitors off at 5 P.M.; but may he order Jews off at 3, or may he order that anyone can be put off by being dumped into the sea?" A. BICKEL, THE L- ST DANGEROUS BRANCH 167 (1962) .
169. Davis, Postscript 832 (italics in original) . Of a soldier one may say, with even greater justice, what Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961 ), said of a prisoner: "l]t has never been held that upon entering a prison one is entirely bereft of all his civil rights and forfeits every protection of the law." To the contrary, the Court long ago declared that "the humblest seaman or marine is to be sheltered under the aegis of the law from any real wrong." Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 123 (1849).
169a. The parallel was sharply drawn by the Supreme Court in O'Callalian v. l'arker, 37 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 2, 1969), where a rape committed offpost by an Army sergeant was held not subject to court martial because it fell outside the fifth amendment exception for cases "when in actual service in time of War or public danger." In consequence, the statutory authorization of court martial ran afoul of fifth amendment guarantees, 170. Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1965). Among prosecutions cited are those of "a commissioned officer who had insulted a nonconmmissioned officer, and a commander who had punished draftees for being drunk" when "offduty or on non-military premises." Profesor Jaffe notes: There is quite obviously a movement in the direction of greater reviewability of military determinations, particularly in peace time. This probably reflects the fact of the peace time draft. The impact of military decision on the ordinary citizen is no longer a rare event born of emergency. It intrudes into the civilian's peace time life and may -witness the dishonorable discharge of the preinduction Communist-importantly affect the conditions of civilian life. On the contrary, Chairman Walter stated that the Act was intended to outlaw arbitrariness "in any case." And not foreseeing Professor Davis's easy conversion of "committed" to "unreviewable," Chairman McCarran stated: "It would be hard, therefore, for anyone to argue that this Act did anything other than cut down the 'cult of discretion'.
... "188 It follows that no appeal to pre-existing exceptions lies for the purpose of cutting down the express statutory directive to set arbitrariness aside. The terms of the statute cannot be altered on the basis of personal predilections and untested assumptions. If courts are to conclude that a given application of Section 10(e) is unreasonable or absurd, let it be on the basis of a carefully considered record, not a priori notions of "intrinsic unsuitability" for review. That task calls for full consciousness that the court is being asked to carve out an exception from the express terms of the Act, not for unquestioning acceptance of Professor Davis's "solution" to his semantic difficulties.
Chairman Walter opened his explanation of the APA with a reference to Pitt's warning that "unlimited power corrupts the possessor," and stated that " [t] oday, in the backwash of the greatest war in history, we need not be reminded of the abuses which inevitably follow unlimited power."' 8 9 The Section 10(e) directive to set arbitrary action aside represents a studied attempt to bar the play of arbitrariness on American soil, articulating a tradition that reaches back to James Wilson's declaration that "[e]very wanton ...and unnecessary act of authority . . . is wrong and tyrannical."' 00 Professor Davis does not disparage such sentiments; he professes to "share Mr. Berger's passionate belief in a Supreme Court remark that 'there is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary power.' "101 But he concludes that the courts "should not undertake to cure all arbi- 
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Congress at the time of enactment, it cannot be maintained that the Committee's quotation of the statutory words "by law committed" gave its blessing to Professor Davis's redefinition. To the contrary, Congress indicated that "committed" simply meant "granted to," 2 a synonym for the dictionary definition, "entrusted with."
2. The House Committee said: "Section 10 on judicial review does not apply in any situation so far as . . . agency action is by law committed to agency discretion. . . . Where laws are so broadly drawn that agencies have large discretion, the situation cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure act .
d..."3
Again "by law committed" means "by law committed" and nothing more despite Professor Davis's implication that his redefinition of the phrase was adopted. The reference to "broadly drawn" grants of "large discretion" speaks to the problems raised by standards which confer virtually limitless discretion. Where limits are not discernible, courts cannot police them. 4 3. The Senate Judiciary Committee Print said of section 10: "The introductory exceptions state the two present general or basic situations in which judicial review is precluded-where (1) the matter is discretionary or (2) statutes withhold judicial powers."
The word "present" seems to me [Davis] to indicate an intent to have previously-existing law continue with respect to review of discretion, and this is the interpretation courts have given. 5 But immediately thereafter the Judiciary Committee Print stated that an "abuse of discretion granted by law" was to be reviewable," thereby precluding Professor Davis's subsequent redefinition of "committed" and confirming that the "present" law with respect to "discretionary" matters was that courts would not substitute their judgment for a "reasonable" determination but would set aside an "abuse of discretion.
' 7
The few Davis citations of courts that uncritically echoed his "solution" barely stir the scales. 8 Since Professor Davis seeks to carve out an exception from the unqualified Section 10(e) directive, he must show that Congress was aware of exceptional cases of nonreview and intended to have such "previously-existing law continue." No such
